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Price/quality competition
is the area of contest between the ADMI and the black market drug
syndicates. To defeat its black market competitors, the ADMI only
needs to provide products of superior quality at comparable prices:
ADMI prices need not be lower, because ADMI and its products will
enjoy many competitive advantages. Unlike black market drug merchants,
the ADMI will provide pharmacologically pure and safe products,
packaged with instructions for safe use. That will eliminate both
the variations in strength and the contaminants that endanger
drug- user health.5
ADMI will offer drugs in more safely ingestible forms; and ADMI
will serve drug user health interests by steering drug users away
from the more dangerous and more addictive drugs in favor of those
that are less dangerous and less addictive. ADMI will provide
safe and secure places for drug ingestion. The criminal syndicates
can match none of ADMI's competitive advantages.
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Under two-tiered price policy,
financially competent drug users will be charged prices competitive
with prevailing black market prices. High drug prices will continue
to deter drug use, but, under interposition, high prices will
provide little or no stimulus to black market suppliers because
of the difficulties of competing against ADMI.
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While financially competent drug users will pay high prices, two-tiered
price policy provides that indigent addicts can be serviced free
or at modest price. That will reduce the crushing financial burden
imposed by addiction. It will reduce the economic compulsion to
the crimes that are characteristic of indigent addicts--prostitution,
robbery, theft, and drug pushing).
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There is no time to discuss the remaining four strategic tools,
but before leaving this subject, I would like to point out that
these last four tools are now tragically underutilized. In the
United States, our neglect of these tools is a major cause of
the drug/crime syndrome. A recent study6. shows that one dollar spent on treatment is seven times as effective
in reducing drug use as a dollar spent on interdiction, and still
we spend money on interdiction, rather than treatment. I should
also point out before passing on that these last four strategic
tools will be much more effective under interposition than now
because the ADMI will be in direct contact with drug users and
because participation rates will be higher (for reasons explained
in the booklet).
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Economic and Fiscal Implications Now the strategic tools have some very remarkable consequences--both
for the financing of crime in America and for the financing of
society's defenses against drug-related harm. Let us start with
some background data.
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Recreational drug users are estimated to consume from 15% to 25%
of total drugs. Addicts consume the rest. Black market drug prices
are estimated to range from 70 to 140 times the ordinary and necessary
cost of production. The latest year for which we have an official
estimate of U.S. drug sales is 1993, and $49 billion is the figure.7
If the real economic worth of drugs sold was only 1/70th of the
price paid, then American drug users paid $49 billion to buy drugs
worth only $700 million. The difference between real value and
the inflated price was $48.3 billion. That amount represents the
drug/crime subsidy. That subsidy financed drug running, gangsterism,
police corruption, and the seduction of new drug users. When we
subsidize crime so generously, we should not be surprised that
we get a lot of it.