Author's note:
The following essay is intended for use as the final element of Part I. of A
Comprehensive Public Health Strategy for Control of the Drug/Crime
Epidemic.
In this position, this
article will form a bridge linking the preceding analysis of the drug/crime
epidemic to the following specification of that epidemic's remedy.
Donald C. Smart
April
5, 1997
Alcohol as a
Dangerous Drug Alcohol is a dangerous drug and a
major public health menace in the United States and many other parts of the
world. As for its health detriments, Holder, Lennox and Blose (1992) report
studies showing that: U.S. drinkers use medical care at twice the rate of
non-drinker members of the same age and gender cohorts; drinkers have shorter
life expectancies and higher mortality rates; and alcohol consumption increases
a person's chances of illness and early death from damaged liver, intestines,
gastrological and endocrine systems, heart, nervous, and respiratory systems,
the throat and esophagus, and from cancer. Still other studies show that alcohol
compromises the immune system and a wide range of medicinal drugs. Beyond these
hazards, drinkers suffer increased risk of accidental injury to themselves and
others from stupor, distorted perception, impaired motor control and psychosis.
The associated social costs are enormous.
Since alcohol is
widely acknowledged to do more harm than all the illegal drugs combined, we
might ask: why is it not illegal? For the answer, we must look at the politics
of alcohol policy in the period of prohibition's repeal. By December of 1933, an
alcohol industry engorged on the super-profits of prohibition, had managed to
buy favorable portrayal of alcohol and the alcohol culture in the news and
entertainment media of the period and to convince very large numbers of
Americans that drinking was better than the combined merits of abstinence and
obedience to the law. The drinkers were joined by those of the abstainers who
had learned the first lesson of alcohol history, and, together with the industry
and its beneficiaries, a coalition formed that decisively out- numbered the
prohibitionists. That is why this dangerous drug is also legal (Kyvig,
1979).
The first lesson
of alcohol history has been treated above: it is that prohibition of alcohol -
society's reflex reaction to alcohol harm - instead of preventing alcohol harm,
fertilized the infamous gangsterism of the 1920's with super-profits from the
illegal traffic in bootlegged alcohol. The social, political and economic
mechanisms that drove the social pathologies of the era of alcohol prohibition
were very much the same as those that drive today's drug/crime epidemic.
At this writing,
we are six decades into the post-prohibition era, a period with its own unique
experience in the control of alcohol. Let us examine now some of the major
aspects of the experience of this era with an eye out for lessons that may be
applicable to our contemporary problem of controlling harm from the presently
illegal drugs.

The State
Monopoly System Several states of the United States
and several foreign countries currently operate governmentally- owned monopolies
(so-called "state monopolies") in the distribution of alcoholic beverages. The
declared rationale for creating these monopolies was to control private
enterprise in the distribution of alcohol and thereby reduce consumption.
There are considerable differences between the existing
alcohol monopolies in their powers and scope of operations, but they all have
this in common: private enterprise in competition with the state monopoly is
prohibited, and criminal sanctions apply. Remarkably, where the state monopolies
exist, the crime-generating effects we usually associate with prohibition range
between non-existent and negligible. The reason for the low level of gangsterism
in bootlegged alcohol is that these governmentally owned monopolies
substantially supply existing market demand. In consequence, where the monopoly
powers are used appropriately, there is little (if any) artificially- created
scarcity to cause alcohol prices greatly to exceed real economic worth; there is
little (or no) opportunity to reap super-profits; and there is little or no
motive to gangsterism in alcohol commerce.

Sweden had one of
the world's most successful alcohol control systems until January 1, 1995. On
that date, the system was significantly altered as a result of an exchange of
trade concessions with the European Community. It was the old system that gave
Sweden its indices of alcohol use and related pathologies--indices that rank
with the lowest in the industrial world (Romanus 1995, p. 38). Since the old
system was responsible for the achievements of Swedish alcohol policy, it is the
old system that is of interest here.

Under the old
system, two state monopolies were employed. One, the so-called Systembolaget,
had jurisdiction over retail sales and sales to restaurants (for diner
consumption). Retail distribution of packaged beer, wine and distilled spirits
was restricted to the state stores of the Systembolaget excepting only in remote
locations with small populations. In such places, the Systembolaget supplied a
local merchant whom it licensed to supply local drinkers. A second
governmentally- created corporation called Vin & Sprit monopolized the
importing of spirits, wine and strong beer, and the production and export of
spirits. Advertising was legally prohibited. The Systembolaget used its
face-to-face relations with alcohol consumers to promote prudence and moderation
in consumption (Romanus, 1993).

State Monopoly
and Licensing Systems in the United States While the Swedish monopolies have
antecedents going back to the middle of the 19th century, the American alcohol
monopolies are all creatures of our repeal era, and all were created without
precedent in our own institutional history. When the 36th state ratified repeal
in 1933, the states regained jurisdiction over alcohol policy within their own
borders, and the states exercised their lately restored power by choosing
variously between the then known three generic systems of alcohol control.
Quixotically, three states chose to continue prohibition: Kansas, Mississippi,
and Oklahoma. Mississippi persisted longest in that choice, holding out until
1966.1
Most of the
others states created Alcohol Control Boards (ABC's) authorized to license
private enterprises at one or more levels of the alcohol commerce ladder. Most
U.S. citizens now live in states with some sort of licensing system.
As for the states that chose the third way, by Holder's 1993
account, seventeen states are still exercising some degree of monopoly control
over alcohol. They were: Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Utah, South Dakota,
Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Alabama, and Mississippi.
The foregoing few
paragraphs should dispel a common illusion regarding the history of alcohol-
related gangsterism in America. Contrary to widely held belief, it was not only
repeal and legalization that brought prohibition' s drug/crime epidemic to an
end: it was also the introduction of the state monopolies with retained
illegality of private commerce in alcohol
that turned back the tide of bootlegging and gangsterism. The capability
of the state monopoly systems to dissipate the crime-generating propensity of
prohibition is a neglected phenomenon of utmost importance. It is the repeated
experience of this phenomenon, under widely varying circumstances, that
validates belief that the drug/crime epidemic of our present time can be
controlled with the aid of a state monopoly drug distribution system, again,
while retaining the present illegality of private enterprise in drug supply
activities.

John D.
Rockefeller II and the
Origins of
the U.S. Alcohol Monopolies The political process leading to creation of the
American alcohol monopolies is especially interesting. A pivotal player in this
process was John D. Rockefeller II (1874-1960). He was the son of the industrial
titan who founded, among other things, the Standard Oil Company. The younger
Rockefeller became a great capitalist in his own right, and, like his father, a
generous philanthropist. He may be best known today as the builder of New York
City's Rockefeller Center.
Rockefeller had
been a lifelong abstainer and an early supporter of prohibition, but when he
observed prohibition's failure to control alcohol and prohibition's propensity
to generate gangsterism and corruption, he switched sides--with carefully staged
public fanfare--to the cause of repeal. His dramatic change of direction in 1930
was widely credited, by observers on both sides of the issue, as the single most
important influence leading the American people to the realization that
prohibition was a failure, that it could not be made to succeed, and that it
should be abandoned (Fosdick 1956, p. 257-258). But that is only the beginning
of the story of Rockefeller's role in alcohol policy.
He went on to
sponsor research on alcohol policy alternatives (Fosdick 1956, p. 259). For this
purpose a large staff was assembled to collect detailed data and analysis on the
world's entire range of alcohol control systems, their histories and their
effectiveness. The research findings were then summarized in a book published in
1933 under the authorship of Rockefeller's principal investigators. This book
evaluates the typical attributes of the licensing and state monopoly systems,
and it provides a working plan for systems of the latter type, including design
details the authors thought suitable to conditions in the United States. The
book under discussion here is Fosdick and Scott's Toward Liquor
Control,
the first systematic tract
for the state monopoly system in our national tradition.
To assure the success of this book, Rockefeller wrote its
introduction, giving his unstinting endorsement to the author's findings and
recommendations. Perhaps because of the public respect accorded its
distinguished sponsor, as well as the merits of the arguments it raised, this
book quickly attracted a publisher and went on to win recognition as a major
contribution to the public debate on alcohol policy. Finally the book was sent
to all of the state legislatures at the time when the latter were formulating
policy to succeed prohibition. Inasmuch as this book put the state monopoly
system on the policy agenda in America, it is safe to say that the state
monopoly systems would not have been planted on American soil but for the
initiative and leadership of John D. Rockefeller II.
It is interesting
to reflect that, under Rockefeller's influence, the change from prohibition at
the peak of its power, to prohibition's collapse and the dawn of the state
monopoly era, took as little as three years. From that remarkable precedent we
must infer that it is possible today that a single individual (or a small group)
armed with great wealth, moral courage and a sense of social mission can
similarly set in motion processes leading to rapid policy change and the sudden
end of our country's present-day drug/crime epidemic.
One final note on
the politics of policy change: until the party conventions
of 1932, both of the major national political parties
supported prohibition. Only for the election of 1932 did the Democrats switch to
an unambiguous position for repeal. Even then, both parties embraced powerful
constituencies and leading advocates on both sides of the issue (Kyvig 1979, p.
158). It is typical of American politics that issues cut across party lines. It
is typical of drug politics that there is no unifying interest (such as social
or economic class, ethnicity, gender, regional, religious, or age differences)
in the social impact of drugs, and there is consequently no basis for
anticipating any particular future partisan alignment on future drug policy
issues. At the same time, it can certainly be anticipated that the drug supply
industry will continue to purchase political favors wherever and whenever it
finds suitable recipients of its largess--regardless of party affiliation.

Why the State
Monopolies? Now let us consider the reasons for preferring the state
monopoly system to the licensing system. For that purpose, the following
excerpts from Fosdick and Scott (with the original italics) will serve as a
starting place.
|
The licensing
system endeavors to establish...controls through negative rules, regulations, conditions and taxes, imposed
from without, upon private enterprise, which necessarily is conducted for
personal profit. The state
Authority plan endeavors to impose these controls through positive
management from within a
public enterprise conducted for the
benefit of society. (p.
78-79)
Under a state
monopoly system...no individual connected with the retail sale would gain one
penny by reason of his sales, nor would his employment be imperiled if he failed
to show good sales returns, as might be the case in private trade...the salaried
employees waiting on the customers in the various state stores would be under
strict supervision not only to see that there was no encouragement of the sale
of liquor, but to make sure that no beverages were sold in violation of the
letter and the spirit of the regulations. (p. 79)
Under the license system on the other hand, competing
private dealers are under constant temptation to build up their sales and
profits. The issuance of liquor licenses to private dealers presupposes the
right to make a living by the sale of liquor. Since his livelihood is at stake,
the private seller always has been, and always will be, interested in sales, and
in nothing but sales. (p. 79-80)
It is...difficult
to see how in the long run...advertising can be eliminated by state law under
the license system...There are too many loopholes, too many indirect methods of
advertising, too many national journals, and broadcasting stations. Under the
Authority plan, the opportunity for control of advertising is far greater.
Indeed it could be practically eliminated if the public interest so demanded. In
any event, the authority could draft an advertising code and force its
acceptance, either through refusal to buy from manufacturers who violated it or
through a selective increase in the retail price of the products of an offender.
(p. 80-81)
...inasmuch as
the retail price of liquor is a central factor in regulating both legal and
illegal consumption, the Authority can use its price-making power as one of its
most effective instruments of control...It is not likely that a state liquor
licensing board can exercise power to fix prices without running afoul of the
strongest kind of opposition and interference from the private business
interests involved. (p. 81-82).
 In contrast...the
Alcohol Control Authority could fix prices without the slightest opposition from
private business interests because the Authority would own the liquor. Through
price control it could, within limits, modify sales volume at will...It would
even be possible to sell certain products at a price below what would show a
profit, if this step were thought expedient as a measure for promoting
temperance through a change in drinking tastes. The Authority would be equally
concerned with defeating the bootlegger and with avoiding the stimulation of
consumption which might follow too low a level of prices. The price of liquor is
thus seen as a two- edged sword, but to avoid disaster the wielder of it must
have exclusive possession of the hilt. (p. 83)
|
Promise and Performance: Two Control Systems Compared
Alcohol control in the United States of the post-prohibition years has been
notably unsuccessful. The best evidence for this is that year after year
following repeal, and for decades at a time, both alcohol consumption and the
indices of related pathologies rose steadily.2
Since our predominant reliance in the post-prohibition period has been
on the licensing system, that system has to take the lion's share of the blame.
The impotence of the licensing agencies has lead to a sea-change in the public
perception of the agencies' reason for being. As the years have gone by, with
the alcohol supply industry steadily whittling away at the powers initially
legislated to the licensing agencies, the public has gradually come to view the
alcohol control boards as mere revenue collection devices devoid of any public
health objective.
Although some licensing systems are more effective than
others, systemic shortcomings appear to insure their long-run impotence.
Inherently the system allows market demand to stimulate investment for profit in
the alcohol supply industry; inherently, the pursuit of profit induces the
industry to stimulate demand through product promotion and advertising; the
system shelters the industry from responsibility for alcohol-associated harm;
the system gives the supply industry abundant wealth to manipulate public
opinion and purchase the gradual relaxation of regulatory constraints.
There is a lesson
to be drawn from this systemic analysis. It is a lesson applicable to policy
regarding the presently illegal drugs, and it is a lesson the advocates of "drug
legalization with controls" should note with caution because it denies their
claim that licensing of legalized drug commerce would provide acceptably low
prevalence of drug use. On the contrary, the proper inference to be drawn is
that, if applied to the illegal drugs, the same system with the same faults will
produce the same result--public health disaster from increased drug use.

As for the state
monopoly system, while it has generally outperformed the licensing system, it
has not yet fully realized Fosdick and Scott's hopes for it. That is not the
fault of their prescription. It is fair to say that their prescription has never
been fully enacted. After all, Toward Liquor Control has never been the
only influence on alcohol policy in the monopolies states. All along, the
alcohol industry has also had its oar in the political water, as have the
persuaded consumers of the industry's products. In consequence, both at their
founding and subsequently, the various monopolies have been variously
compromised.

The preceding
paragraph is no justification for cynicism or fatalistic resignation regarding
the fate of legislative proposals; nor is it grounds for condemning the
political processes of our democracy. Our political system is not intended to
produce perfect laws. What we want of law in a democracy is compromise weighted
to the political influence of the sundry constituencies active in the politics
of the contested issue--whatever the issue. In our democracy, the opportunity is
always available to strike a new compromise: all we have to do is bring the
votes to the political bargaining table.

Today much
greater diversity exists between the monopolies than can be described here, but
a few examples will suggest the range of variety. No state manufactures
alcoholic beverages (as Sweden's and other foreign monopolies have done or
continue to do); sale of distilled spirits for consumption off premises is
almost always restricted to state stores, but the retail distribution of beer
and wine is often by private enterprise retailers under a licensing system.
Michigan's monopoly now functions only at the wholesale level, with all
retailing "privatized." Utah allows only beer to be sold in grocery stores.
On-premises consumption of hard liquor is typically restricted to licensed
private enterprises, but in two states, such sales are restricted to municipally
operated taverns. (Gruenewald and Janes, 1988). Further to becloud evaluation,
the state monopoly system is not without examples of substantial perversion: for
example, like an aggressive merchant in private enterprise, New Hampshire has
come to operate its now highly profitable state monopoly as a revenue device. It
even uses lower prices to increase sales to price-conscious drinkers in
neighboring Massachusetts, where beverages are taxed (Holder 1993, p.
315).
So which is better? licensing, or the state monopoly system?
The evidence from field observation at home is mixed. Some states with license
systems have lower consumption rates than some of the (nominally) monopoly
states. This has led some alcohol policy analysts to conclude that variations in
the strictness of other aspects of the regulatory systems are more significant
determinants of consumption than the generic system itself. Thus a study by
Huddle, Fuchs, and Holder, over a twenty-five year time period, supports their
conclusion that "the more restrictive states showed lower consumption than the
less restrictive states," without regard for whether the state used a license or
monopoly system. (Holder, 1987, p.413)

On the other
hand, great successes abroad suggest that we in American have not yet wrung the
monopoly system for all it can give. It remains generally true of the monopolies
that the closer the institutional design is to the prescriptions of Fosdick and
Scott, the lower the resulting rate of consumption.

Indications of
Inherent Superiority That the state monopoly system is inherently more
effective than the licensing system is hinted by studies of changes in alcohol
consumption rates when states convert from monopoly systems to licensing
systems. Several studies by highly expert researchers have been conducted in
this problem area. Holder (1994) summarized the result of several other studies
over a twenty-year period--all involving a partial or complete elimination of
state monopoly control--in Idaho, Maine, Washington, Virginia, Canada, and New
Zealand. Holder concluded that, although some studies showed different results,
when correction was made for methodological errors, the cumulative evidence is
that significant increases in consumption occurred in all cases where a state
monopoly role was privatized.

A still later
study shows just how significant these increases were: "...we found significant
increases in wine sales after privatization...42 % in Alabama, 150% in Idaho,
137% in Maine, 75% in Montana and 15% in New Hampshire." The per annum increases
in liters of pure ethanol consumed in the form of wine were "621,000 in Alabama,
432,000 in Idaho, 364,000 in Maine, 363,000 in Montana and 171,000 in New
Hampshire," and the conclusion drawn--"The structure of the retail alcohol
distribution system has a significant effect on alcohol sales." (Wagenaar and
Holder, 1995)

Inherent
Superiority of the State Monopoly System For the reasons identified by
Fosdick and Scott and set out above, the state monopoly system appears
inherently to be most powerful at reducing alcohol consumption. Economic theory
explains this superiority at a higher level of generalization, and it explains
as well the differences in the effectiveness of the sundry state monopolies.
Through the lens of economic theory, the effectiveness of any control system
is dependent upon the extent to which the control institution is empowered to
interrupt the mutual stimulation between the supply and demand sides of the
market.

As for the supply
side stimulus to demand, under a state monopoly regime, advertising and
promotion can be made illegal, as well as distribution by private entrepreneur.
Without advertising and promotion, fewer young people are seduced into
experimentation with alcohol, and fewer individuals consequently come to
incorporate alcohol into their life-style. With a reduced pool of alcohol
consumers, fewer people succumb to alcoholism and the associated pathologies.
In contrast, under the state licensing systems, it is
difficult to constrain advertising (the supply industry's principal tool for
stimulating demand) because alcohol is a legal commodity in private enterprise,
and advertising that targets adults is protected as free speech. Under the
licensing system, advertising and promotion can be constrained legally only to
the extent that it can be demonstrated that children are targeted because, for
children, alcohol is an illegal commodity. Returning to the higher theoretical
level, the licensing system is inherently less powerful at reducing the supply
side stimulus to demand.

As for the demand
side stimulus to the supply industry, a state monopoly can be given powers that
depress the rate of profit for businesses at the unmonopolized levels of the
commercial ladder. The direct effects and positive feedback loops then operate
as follows:
*
Profit-seekers are discouraged from investing in
production and distribution facilities,
*
Advertising and promotion are
constrained by reduced resources,
*
Reduced financial resources are
available for purchase of legislative favors and for
bribing public employees in the oversight
functions,
*
The number of people who identify their economic
well-being with the alcohol
industry
shrinks, and, in consequence, the political weight shifts further in favor
of
the alcohol control
forces,
*
Fewer people use alcohol and get in trouble with it,
and
*
The health detriments and social costs associated with the use of
alcohol are
diminished.

State monopoly
systems can also be designed to eliminate altogether the demand side stimulus to
the supply industry. For this purpose, the supply industry functions of
retailing, wholesaling, manufacture, import and export can all be relegated to a
state monopoly, as Finland and Sweden have done. Monopolization of the entire
industry renders moot the legal status of advertising. Whether advertising is
legal or not, no one will go to the trouble and expense of advertising a product
from the sale of which no profit can be gained. By the same token, without
financial inducements from alcohol industrialists, the entertainment media would
cease to go out of its way to portray alcohol favorably.

Monopoly systems
empowered to employ economic measures of the sort above generally described can
achieve their public health objective without stimulating black market commerce,
and without reliance on criminal justice measures. Society can be spared
enormous medical, social and material costs. Such systems also offer stability
over time at minimal cost in political struggle.

What to Do
with Net Income? To discourage demand, a tactic
available to alcohol monopolies is to peg the retail price as high as possible
without attracting bootleggers to enter the market. This tactic also tends to
produce high revenue (as compared to the cost of operations), so state alcohol
monopolies typically operate at a profit (Harrison and Laine, 1936). The
profitability of the state monopolies raises an associated policy question--what
to do with the surplus of income over cost? Fosdick and Scott endorsed what has
become the dominant response to this question--to direct the surplus into the
general fund, where it can be used to defray any of the competing costs of
government. As already mentioned, this practice has the disadvantage that it
creates a conflict of interest between revenue- generation and the public health
purpose of alcohol control. The alcohol supply industry takes advantage of this
conflict of interests; it mobilizes friendly constituencies to weaken the
legislative shackles to allow more sales and increase governmental revenues.
Needless to say, industry profits increase--the real objective.
Then increased profits become a stimulus to still further
production and sales effort, and soon the alcohol industry is working still
harder (and with increased resources) for still further erosion of state
controls.

In contradiction
to Fosdick and Scott, your author believes that, instead of directing the
operating surplus to the general fund, the surplus should be dedicated to
alcohol prevention measures and to remedying alcohol harm. (Prevention and
remediation measures, reduce demand, and demand reduction reduces the stimulus
to supply--a desirable feedback loop.) No disproportional allocation of
resources can result from this dedication because, under this scheme, the size
of the surplus will automatically wax and wane in proportion to the waxing and
waning of alcohol use. In consequence, at least this one resource for the
funding of prevention and remedial effort will vary automatically with the real
size of the alcohol epidemic. As used here, "automatically" means "without need
for further political struggle."

State
Monopolies and Socialism Inasmuch as public ownership of the means of
production is a tenet and objective of socialism, and inasmuch as American
capitalists have typically been stalwart opponents of socialism, the reader may
wonder how John D. Rockefeller II, an American capitalist par
excellence,
came to his advocacy of
the state alcohol distribution system. The question is of more than historical
interest if the answer can predict how our contemporary American capitalists
might react to proposed use of the state monopoly system as an element of a
comprehensive public health strategy for control of the drug/crime epidemic. The
following excerpt from Rockefeller's introduction to Toward Liquor
Control
provides a good start toward
the answer to this question.
|
 ...only as the
profit motive is eliminated is there any hope of controlling the liquor traffic
in the interest of a decent society. To approach the problem from any other
angle is only to tinker with it and to ensure failure.
|

From this
statement it is apparent that John D. Rockefeller II understood with crystal
clarity the most important lessons from the history of effort to control
alcohol, that:
The proper use of
the profit motive is for stimulating production and distribution of socially
beneficial goods and services.
- Society does not need to tolerate private enterprise in
commodities that corrupt the public health, and we certainly should not reward
it.
- The state monopoly system is the best way to suppress
private enterprise in commodities for corruption of the public health.

The reader is
left to form his/her own opinion as to whether today's capitalists and trustees
of great wealth will take the same points.

An Epilogue
An illusion that sustains prohibition (both of alcohol and the presently
illegal drugs) is that the policy choice is between legalization and
prohibition. On the strength of that illusion, most people put up with the all
too evident faults of prohibition, believing that legalization would be worse.
Obviously the advocates of legalization take the opposite view.
An unfortunate irony from the history of the repeal movement
is that some health practitioners became advocates for the legalization of
alcohol. Perhaps they had become so concerned with the social costs of
prohibition's crime epidemic, that harm from alcohol became a distinctly lesser
evil. Be that as it may, by belittling the hazards of alcohol, these health
professionals helped set the stage, not only for repeal, but for both the social
acceptance of alcohol and for our alcohol problems decades later.

With the
introduction of the state monopoly system as a public policy option,
belittlement of the alcohol danger lost its "lesser evil" justification, and
belittlement of alcohol's dangers should have been abandoned. Consistent loyalty
to public health now appears to demand choice of the state monopoly system as
the best means to control the alcohol/crime epidemic. But to advocate the state
monopoly system does imply that alcohol is a dangerous drug--potentially an
embarrassing admission for one who has long belittled the alcohol danger as a
lesser evil.

Some health
professionals will inevitably confront the same problem in the drug policy
controversy of today. If drugs are not really so dangerous, (as some advocates
of legalization now say), then the proper remedy for our contemporary drug/crime
epidemic is simply legalization, and there is no need of controls of any sort.
On the other hand, if the illegal drugs are genuinely dangerous, then a control
system is needed, and the choice of policy tools for that purpose should include
a state monopoly system to suppress the mutual stimulation of drug supply and
demand and abate the drug/crime epidemic.
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The BOTTOM LINE on Alcohol in Society (1995), Alcohol
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Catlin, George E.G. (1932) "Alternatives to
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Social Science, vol 163, p. 181-187.
Fosdick, Raymond Blaine (1956) John D.
Rockefeller, Jr,: a Portrait,
New
York: Harper.
Fosdick, Raymond Blaine and Albert L. Scott (1933)
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forward by
John D. Rockefeller II, New York and London: Harper and Brothers.
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After Repeal: A Study of Liquor Control Administration,
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Holder, Harold D. (1994) "Results from the
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