There are considerable differences between the existing alcohol monopolies in their powers and scope of operations, but they all have this in common: private enterprise in competition with the state monopoly is prohibited, and criminal sanctions apply. Remarkably, where the state monopolies exist, the crime-generating effects we usually associate with prohibition range between non-existent and negligible. The reason for the low level of gangsterism in bootlegged alcohol is that these governmentally owned monopolies substantially supply existing market demand. In consequence, where the monopoly powers are used appropriately, there is little (if any) artificially- created scarcity to cause alcohol prices greatly to exceed real economic worth; there is little (or no) opportunity to reap super-profits; and there is little or no motive to gangsterism in alcohol commerce.

Sweden had one of the world's most successful alcohol control systems until January 1, 1995. On that date, the system was significantly altered as a result of an exchange of trade concessions with the European Community. It was the old system that gave Sweden its indices of alcohol use and related pathologies--indices that rank with the lowest in the industrial world (Romanus 1995, p. 38). Since the old system was responsible for the achievements of Swedish alcohol policy, it is the old system that is of interest here.

Under the old system, two state monopolies were employed. One, the so-called Systembolaget, had jurisdiction over retail sales and sales to restaurants (for diner consumption). Retail distribution of packaged beer, wine and distilled spirits was restricted to the state stores of the Systembolaget excepting only in remote locations with small populations. In such places, the Systembolaget supplied a local merchant whom it licensed to supply local drinkers. A second governmentally- created corporation called Vin & Sprit monopolized the importing of spirits, wine and strong beer, and the production and export of spirits. Advertising was legally prohibited. The Systembolaget used its face-to-face relations with alcohol consumers to promote prudence and moderation in consumption (Romanus, 1993).

State Monopoly and Licensing Systems in the United States While the Swedish monopolies have antecedents going back to the middle of the 19th century, the American alcohol monopolies are all creatures of our repeal era, and all were created without precedent in our own institutional history. When the 36th state ratified repeal in 1933, the states regained jurisdiction over alcohol policy within their own borders, and the states exercised their lately restored power by choosing variously between the then known three generic systems of alcohol control. Quixotically, three states chose to continue prohibition: Kansas, Mississippi, and Oklahoma. Mississippi persisted longest in that choice, holding out until 1966.¹

Most of the others states created Alcohol Control Boards (ABC's) authorized to license private enterprises at one or more levels of the alcohol commerce ladder. Most U.S. citizens now live in states with some sort of licensing system.

In an unpublished paper, Holder and Cherpitel examined several indices for evidence that, with the Mississippi repeal, increased availability resulted in increased use. They concluded with the belief that use did not increase. If increased availability increases use, and the end of prohibition produced no increase in use, then there seemingly was also no increase in availability. The implication is that Mississippi's prohibition had failed completely to reduce availability.